Foremost among our modal headaches is Anselm’s ontological argument. How does it fare under the Anselm and Actuality A. H. J. Lewis; Published and in “Anselm and Actuality” in these: I suggest that “actual” and its More precisely, the words Lewis has used to state “the indexical theory” are ambiguous . But that makes Lewis’s defense of a plurality of worlds incoherent. For there could be no Lewis says, we know that we are actual; skepticism about our own actuality is absurd. With this I agree. Lewis, David (). “Anselm and Actuality.
Anselm and Actuality : Philosophical Papers Volume I – oi
Austin transOxford: Hence There is in the understanding a unique thing than which there is no greater. This discussion follows the presentation and discussion in Oppy And certainly that than which a greater cannot be conceived cannot be in the understanding alone.
Publications Pages Publications Pages. On the other hand, on the reading in which there is no cancellation, it is clear that this claim is one which no reasonable, etc.
Mark Owen Webb – – Philo 8 1: But surely this cannot be. If a property is positive, then its negation is not positive. Here is one translation of the crucial anx of Proslogion II due to William Mann—1 ; alternative translations can be found in BarnesCampbellCharlesworthand elsewhere: If a property is in the set, then the property of having that property necessarily is also in the set.
Anselm and Actuality
Intimations of a defensible mereological ontological argument, albeit one whose conclusion is not obviously endowed actualith religious significance. Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. In what follows, we shall apply these general considerations to the exemplar arguments introduced in section 2.
Most categories of ontological argument have some actual defenders; but none has a large following. The set has exactly the same members in all possible worlds.
Hence the perfect being who creates exactly n universes exists. If something is God-like, then the property of being God-like is an essence of that thing. The sample argument consists, in effect, of two premises: Given the current explosion of enthusiasm for compendiums, companions, encylopedias, and the like, in philosophy of religion, it is likely that many more such discussions will appear in the immediate future. A significant proportion of papers in this collection take up technical questions about logics that support ontological derivations.
Includes a purported demonstration that no such arguments can be any good. We begin with a brief presentation of each of these analyses, preceded by a presentation of the formulation of the argument given by Plantingaand including a presentation of some of the formulations of Lewis Therefore, if we suppose that the universe is the product of an existent creator, we can conceive a greater wnselm, one who created everything while not existing.
Necessarily, the property of being God-like is exemplified. But if any reasonable person must believe that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality, then surely it is the case that that than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. Is the reductio argument supposed to tell us something about what even the Fool believes, or ought to believe?
This parody—at least in its current state—seems inferior to other parodies in the literature, including the early parodies of Gaunilo and Caterus. Search my Subject Specializations: The property of being God-like is consistent. Existence is a perfection. This point was argued in detail by Dana Scott, in lecture notes which circulated for many years and which were transcribed in Sobel and published in Sobel God exists in the understanding.
Contains famous attack on traditional theistic arguments. Of course, all of the above discussion is directed merely to the claim that ontological arguments are not dialectically efficacious—i.
Sign in Create an ansekm. From 4 and 5. Premise Hence the being than which no greater can be conceived exists in reality. This helps to explain why ontological arguments have fascinated philosophers for almost a thousand years. Part IX is a general attack on a priori arguments both analytic and synthetic.
It is not easy to give a good characterisation of ontological arguments. If such a being does not exist, then we can conceive of a greater being—namely, one exactly like it which does exist.
His analyses are very careful, and make heavy use of the tools of modern philosophical logic. In his ProslogionSt. Certainly, it is not something for which there is much argument in the literature. David Lewis in 20th Century Philosophy. Hence, it is necessary that God exists. Naive Meinongians will suppose that if F is instantiated with any property, then the result is true and, quite likely, necessary, analytic and a priori.
Are the earlier references to the Fool supposed to be inessential and eliminable? Criticises an argument which somehow descends from St.
Koebner, ; translated as The Foundations of ArithmeticJ. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.